The controversy surrounding the PDP leadership crisis has sparked significant legal debate. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s dismissal of the cross-appeal filed by J.B. Daudu on behalf of Samuel Anyanwu, A.K. Ajibade, and Umar Bature is well-grounded in law.
The core issue was clearly outlined in the Court of Appeal’s reasoning and was subsequently confirmed by the Supreme Court.
The Court of Appeal made a careful distinction between two related yet legally separate questions. First, it reaffirmed the settled principle that the validity of a suspension within a political party is an internal matter, over which courts generally lack jurisdiction. On that issue, the court declined to decide whether the suspension of party officials was justified.
However, the court didn’t stop there. It then examined the factual situation before it and found, importantly, that A.K. Ajibade was suspended on record. Even more significantly, there was no evidence before the court that the suspension had been lifted at any relevant time.
Based on that uncontested fact, the court reached the decisive conclusion that, during the suspension, Ajibade could not legally serve as the party’s National Legal Adviser. He lacked the authority to perform the duties of that position and could not legitimately act in any official capacity.
This reasoning applied not only to Ajibade but also to other officials affected, including Anyanwu and Bature, whose authority similarly depended on their status within the party at that time.
It was this vital aspect of the judgment that led to the cross-appeal. Notably, the Anyanwu faction did not initiate the main appeal; that task was undertaken by the Turaki-led National Working Committee (NWC), which challenged the broader question of whether the Ibadan convention was justiciable at all, arguing it was an internal party matter.
In contrast, the cross-appeal filed by J.B. Daudu was narrowly focused. It aimed to overturn the Court of Appeal’s reliance on the suspension, fully aware that accepting that finding would significantly weaken the faction’s legal and political standing.
The arguments made in the cross-appeal were extensive. Counsel argued that the issue of Ajibade’s suspension was not part of the original case, was introduced sua sponte by the appellate court, and that the parties were denied the chance to argue it. They also claimed that the matter was purely factual, that reliance on it would cause a miscarriage of justice, and that it violated the constitutional right to a fair hearing.
However, the Supreme Court was not convinced. In a unanimous ruling, it dismissed the cross-appeal for lack of merit and upheld the Court of Appeal’s reasoning.
By doing so, the Supreme Court reinforced a clear legal principle. While courts may refrain from judging internal party decisions, they are not blind to the facts. Where a suspension exists and remains unchallenged or unlifted, the legal consequences of that status cannot be ignored.
The implication of this ruling is straightforward and far-reaching. During the suspension, Anyanwu and his associates lacked lawful authority to act on behalf of the party. Any actions taken in an official capacity during that period are therefore legally invalid.
Practically, this undermines the legitimacy of the so-called Ogogoro convention, whose validity is called into question by the incapacity of those claiming to organize or validate it.
The Supreme Court’s decision reaffirms the legal doctrine that authority within an organization depends on status. If that status is impaired, the legitimacy of any actions taken under it is also compromised.
